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Abstract The optical instruments developed through the seventeenth century 
allowed peering into the very far and the very small; a spectacle never before 
experienced. The telescope, and later the microscope, was now expected to answer 
fundamental questions and resolve cosmological riddles by direct observation into 
the foundations of nature. But this ability came at an unexpected price and with 
unexpected results. For Kepler and Galileo, the new instruments did not offer exten-
sion and improvement to the senses; they replaced them altogether. To rely on their 
authority was to admit that the human eye is nothing but an instrument, and a flawed 
one at that. Rather than the intellect’s window to the world, the human senses became 
a part of this world, a source of obscure and unreliable data, demanding uncertain 
deciphering. Accurate scientific observation meant that we are always wrong.
1  Introduction
On receiving news of Galileo’s observations of the four satellites of Jupiter and the 
rugged face of the moon through his newly invented perspicillum, Kepler in great 
excitement exclaimed:
Therefore let Galileo take his stand by Kepler’s side. Let the former observe the moon with 
his face turned skyward, while the latter studies the sun by looking down at a screen (lest 
the lens injure his eyes). Let each employ his own device, and from this partnership may 
there some day arise an absolutely perfect theory of the distances.1
This Hollywood-like scene of the two astronomers marching hand in hand toward 
the dawn of a new scientific era was no attempt by Kepler to appropriate Galileo’s 
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success or to diminish the novelty of the telescope.2 On the contrary, Kepler repeatedly 
asserted how short sighted he was in misjudging the potential for astronomical 
observations inherent in lenses, and how radically Galileo’s instrument transformed 
the science of astronomy. It was a deep sense of recognition that beyond their dif-
ferent scientific temperaments and projects, they shared a common agenda of a new 
mode of empirical engagement with the phenomenal world: the instrument. For 
Kepler and Galileo, empirical investigation was no longer a direct engagement with 
nature, but an essentially mediated endeavor. The new instruments were not to 
assist the human senses, but to replace them.
2  Galileo: An Instrument for an Eye
The eye, in this new scheme, was to become a part of the instrument. When Kepler 
describes the nipple shaped lens, which he suggests as an improvement to Galileo’s 
telescope, he explains that the position of the observer’s eye depends on the “spot 
where the rays from all points of the object under observation converge at a com-
mon focus (this is the function of the hyperbolic nipple).”3 The rays coming parallel 
from a distant point are converged by the nipple shaped lens at the crystalline 
humor and are continually refracted within the eye until “they strike the retina.” The 
resulting image is “quite confused” and in order to set it right, Kepler suggests 
another lens to manipulate these inner refractions by adjusting the coming of the 
rays as if “they come from some nearby point.” The result will be that the rays will 
“find their points of convergence on the retina itself. This is the definition of clear 
vision.”4 Kepler does not differentiate between the “natural” ocular membranes – 
the crystalline humor and retina – and the artificial lenses and screens; they are all 
integrated into a continuous process that creates from the rays of light a clear pic-
ture on a flat opaque surface.
Kepler’s account of his suggested improvement to Galileo’s invention accords 
well with Galileo’s own instructions for its use. Such special instructions are 
required, and provided in the first pages of his Sidereus Nuncius, because unlike 
2 Kepler’s ulterior motives constitute the crux of Biagioli’s recent reconstruction of this exchange 
(Biagioli 2006, esp. 33–39). Biagioli queries Kepler’s hasty and enthusiastic reply to Galileo’s 
request to assess his telescopic observations, when in fact Kepler had not yet seen a telescope or 
observed personally the celestial phenomena Galileo claimed to have seen. Biagioli claims that 
the distance between Galileo and Kepler and the partial information Kepler had regarding 
Galileo’s status in the Florentine court contributed to this exchange. Albeit, one should notice that 
Kepler’s inability to build a high power telescope was due to specific practical problems concern-
ing lens production and not to lack of theory about how telescopes work and how lenses magnify. 
Kepler’s embraced Galileo’s telescope as a confirmation of his optical theories and of his proposed 
observational practice using instruments in preference of a naked eye.
3 Kepler 1965 [1610], 20.
4 Kepler 1965 [1610], 21.
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optical predecessors such as the spectacles, the scientific instrument does not sim-
ply strengthen the weak eye. It thoroughly replaces the ‘natural’ function of the 
sense organ with reasoned procedure of observation, into which measurement and 
comparison are built and into which the eyes should be assimilated. Galileo first 
cautions the readers that they have to “prepare a most accurate glass that shows 
objects brightly, distinctly, and not veiled by any obscurity.” He then asks them to 
verify the power of magnification through an exercise that demands both the ability 
to produce accurate geometrical drawings of two circles, one 400 times larger than 
the other- together with the ability to force the eyes to gaze each at different objects, 
yet still be able to compare their sizes. After adjusting the eyes to the instrument, 
Galileo proceeds to his sketchy instructions as to how to measure distances viewed 
through the telescope’s lenses.5
These instructions did not reveal to Galileo’s readers how fundamentally novel 
was the status he assigned to his instrument. The telescope was accepted with great 
fanfare and immediately embraced by the scholarly community.6 In fact, it seemed 
like an excellent way to conduct innovative astronomy without being entangled 
with the cosmological ramifications of the new astronomical theories, and was 
enthusiastically endorsed for this reason by the Jesuits.7 “Now no part of the sky 
escapes our glance,” they rhapsodized about “the lynx eyes:”
nor is the beauty of the moon so great as it was for us formerly. We have been able to 
distinguish the circular motions of Venus and Mercury, and who does not blush to see the 
sun occasionally disfigured? We have laid bare the stratagems of Mars in approaching the 
earth and we have exposed the attendance of Jupiter and Saturn, hitherto hidden away to 
no purpose.8
But these very words, written a decade after the introduction of the telescope, did 
nothing but set up the inevitable clash between the radical epistemology that 
Galileo attached to the new instrument and the traditionalist project to which the 
Jesuits were attempting to harness it. The occasion for drawing clear lines between 
the modes of instrument-aided observation was introduced by the appearance of a 
sequence of three comets in the European sky during 1618 (Fig. 1).
The three comets – especially the third – were most impressive and had been 
carefully observed in late November by astronomers all over Europe, initiating a 
masquerade of astronomical treatises in which anonymous writers, pseudonyms 
and false authorship paraded through the European astronomical community, 
examining the demarcation lines between appearances and substances, optical illu-
sions and authentic events.
5 Galilei 1989 [1610], 38–39.
6 See Malet 2005, Shea 1972, and van Helden 1974.
7 van Helden 1974, 53.
8 Grassi 1619, 5–6.
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Galileo’s entrée into this parade and the positions he expresses in it are very 
surprising. Never having observed the comets himself, he waited until an anony-
mous treatise by the Jesuit mathematician Horatio Grassi, De Tribus Cometis Anni 
1618 Disputatio Astronomica (1619) introduced the issues of the scholarly discus-
sion about these spectacular objects. Grassi’s views are ones that Galileo should 
Fig. 1 The Comets of 1618
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have been delighted with. Not only does he begin with the tribute to Galileo and his 
instrument cited above, his main conclusion is one that should have particularly 
appealed to Galileo: “our comet was not sublunar” he declares, “but clearly celestial.”9 
Tycho Brahe had already arrived at this conclusion concerning the comet of 1577, 
as well as the Nova Stella of 1572, but the idea that comets and other transient 
objects are superlunary did not lose its revolutionary cosmological significance. 
The sharp dichotomy between the realm under and above the moon, which the 
heavenly position of comets undermined, was not an arcane scholarly conviction; it 
was well entrenched in religion and commonsense.10 If Galileo was engaged in “a 
polemic against the Aristotelian and scholastic physics,”11 as is commonly assumed, 
Grassi and Tycho should have been his close allies and the superlunary position of 
the comets his cherished weapon.
Yet Galileo chooses to join the discussion with a fierce assault on Grassi’s 
Disputatio. He does it stealthily, dictating a Discourse on the Comets in Tuscan 
through his disciple and fellow academician Mario Guiducci (1619).12 Grassi, how-
ever, is not fooled. He mocks “Galileo [for] order[ing] the matter to be discussed 
through intermediaries and interpreters” and joins the play of “secrets of mind” by 
replying with Astronomical and Philosophical Balance, apparently composed with 
other members of the Collegio Romano, under the anagram Lothario Sarsi of 
Siguenza (Sigensano 1619). For the celebrated climax of the debate Galileo 
unmasked and answered ‘Sarsi’s’ Latin Balance (Libra) with his own – again 
Tuscan – The Assayer (Il Saggiatore, 1623), simultaneously denying that he was 
behind Guiducci and complaining about Sarsi’s lack of manners in exposing him.13 
This was more than literary playfulness. In The Assayer Galileo not only discloses 
his own true identity and points to that of his rivals, but urges the reader to unmask 
Nature herself to see beyond “the bounty [of] her effects.”14
Modern historians and philosophers of science, ensnared by these playful 
polemics, usually read The Assayer as a defense of Copernican astronomy against 
a complex of theological and conservative views of nature. But Galileo’s arguments 
and those of Grassi’s he chooses to refute demonstrate that the polemics are about 
the power and significance of instrumental observation. Yet Galileo does not defend 
the value of the telescope, which Grassi, we saw, has never doubted. Galileo takes 
9 Grassi 1619, 14.
10 Concerning the significance of the superlunary position of comets see Van Nouhuys 1998. On 
the difficulties the Jesuits had with Tycho’s cosmology see: Baldini 1992, 217–250; Blackwell 
1992, esp. 148–153; Lattis 1994, 94–102, 211–216.
11 Cassirer 1942, 316.
12 Favaro asserts that “the pages of the first part … have corrections and additions in Galileo’s 
handwriting. A second part … is entirely in Galileo’s writing. The third part in Guiducci’s hand 
… but there are correction by [Galileo]” and concludes that “the entire discourse may be said to 
be essentially his work.” Quoted in Drake and O’Malley 1960, xvi–xvii.
13 Galileo 1623, 169.
14 Galilei 1623, 236. “La ricchezza della natura.” In Galilei 1890–1909, 6: 281.
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the opportunity of the discussion about comets to pursue his (and Kepler’s) new 
empiricism, in which instruments are to replace the human senses.
Galileo reveals these intentions by targeting Grassi’s two main arguments for the 
superlunary position of comets. The first one is based on the same method Tycho 
had perfected a generation earlier to make his claims about the celestial position of 
comets:
If the comet was observed from different places and compared with the stars of the firma-
ment, and if it preserved the same distance from them, it must be regarded as either in the 
firmament or certainly not far removed from it. But if it underwent parallax, it must be 
placed below the firmament in proportion to the amount of the difference of aspect.15
Parallax calculations – the comparison of the angles of sight from different posi-
tions – was a traditional and most venerable method of observational astronomy. 
For Grassi and the Jesuits, it gained further support through their intricate network 
of scholars and institutions deployed all over Europe. When observers in “Milan 
and in Parma … from Innsbruck in Germany and from France and Belgium” report 
the same position for the comet, and when finally two particularly accurate obser-
vations from Rome and Cologne completely coalesce in time and place, Grassi 
feels validated. The claim for the superlunary position of the comets does not 
“exceed the boundaries of our knowledge” and remains within the realm of empiri-
cal modesty.16
Yet what for Grassi is a carefully measured factual conclusion is completely 
unacceptable for Galileo. “Parallax operates reliably,” he lets Guiducci claim on his 
behalf, “in real and permanent things whose essence is not affected by anyone’s 
vision; these do not change place when the eye is moved. But parallax does not 
function in mere appearances,” and comets are among those
reflections of light, images, and wandering simulacra which are so dependent for their 
existence upon the vision of the observer that not only do they change position when he 
does, but … would vanish entirely if his vision were taken away.17
Galileo’s real target should not be mistaken. It is neither the case that he harbored 
some deep aversion to parallax considerations, nor that he was particularly commit-
ted to Aristotelian meteorology or convinced in the errors of Tycho’s way, or even 
that he was indeed so careful in his own parallax observations as to limit them only 
to unquestionably solid celestial bodies. In a series of public lectures following the 
supernova of 1604, for example, he took a clear Tychonic position and used the lack 
of parallax to argue that the new star was super lunar.18 What Galileo is really 
assaulting is a particular type of empiricism, encapsulated in Grassi’s knock-down 
parallax argument:
15 Grassi 1619, 11.
16 Grassi 1619, 6.
17 Guiducci 1619, 36–37.
18 Galilei 1890–1909, 2: 277–284. Cf. Dupré 2003, 373.
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If at the same time from other regions the same star was also observed very near to the 
comet, no stronger and clearer argument could be hoped for by which it might be 
demonstrated that the comet had very little or no parallax, since this could be observed 
without any instrument and by observation with the unaided eye.19
This last clause captures for Galileo the Jesuit-Tychonic position on parallax, an 
approach to scientific observation which he is obliged to confront and against 
which he defines his own empiricism. For Grassi and the Jesuits, the final arbitrator 
and the measure of all observations is the “unaided eye.” Their parallax observa-
tions are particularly trustworthy, they assume, because they can be conducted 
“without any instrument.” Galileo’s arguments aim at the conditions of visibility 
necessary for parallax measurements because he wishes to undermine the funda-
mental assumption of the Jesuits’ epistemology – the reliability of observation by 
the naked eye:
in order to have the comet appear as without parallax to all observers, and still originate in 
the elemental sphere, it would suffice for vapours … to be diffused on high and to be 
capable of reflecting the sun’s light through distances and spaces equal to … those from 
which the comet is perceived.20
Parallax is liable to the baffling effects of appearances and optical illusions because 
it is dependent on the naked eye. This is the crux of Galileo’s surprising assault: 
observation “without any instrument” is not preferable, it is, on the contrary, fun-
damentally suspect.
Galileo further focuses the attack on the naked eye in answering Grassi’s other 
main argument for the superlunary position of comets.  “It has been discovered by 
long experience,” claims Grassi,
and proved by optical reason that all things observed with this instrument [the telescope] 
seem larger than they appear to the naked eye; yet according to the law that the enlargement 
appears less and less the farther away [the observed things] are removed from the eye, it 
results that fixed stars, the most remote of all from us, receive no perceptible magnification 
from the telescope. Therefore, since the comet appeared to be enlarged very little it … is 
more remote from us than the moon, since when [the moon] has been observed through the 
telescope it appears much larger.21
This is the one argument that Galileo would not forgive. He would not allow that 
one can conclude about the distance of the comets from the failure of the telescope 
19 Grassi 1619, 14. Italics added. “Si enim in aliis etiam regionibus eodem tempore eadem stella 
cometae proxima observaretur, nullum maius atque evidentius optari poterat argumentum, quo-
demonstraretur nullum aut perexiguam parallaxim cometae fuisse, cum hocabsque ullo instru-
mento, unico oculorum intuitu, observari posset.” Grassi in Galilei 1890–1909, 6: 31.
20 Guiducci 1619, 40. One should note how much Galileo’s argument is as removed from “opposi-
tion to the closed system of the schools,” as Drake presented “The Assayer” in the preface to 
Drake and O’ Malley, 1960, xxiii. Galileo’s rejection of the parallax is based on proto-Aristotelian 
concept of the comets as resulting from exuding vapors, and furthermore, preserves “the 
Aristotelian duality” between heavens and the “elemental sphere.”
21 Grassi 1619, 17.
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to magnify them, because he will not admit to this failure; the telescope magnifies 
regardless of distance:
If a surface of a ball seen through the telescope at a distance of half a mile increases a 
thousand times, then so will the moon’s disc increase a thousand times and no less; so will 
that of Jupiter and finally that of a fixed star.22
It is important to stress again that Grassi is an avowed supporter of the telescope 
and “the lynx eyes.” The telescope is a legitimate, marvelous extension of the eye, 
strengthening its weaknesses and repairing its errors. Indeed, interpreting Galileo 
as arguing for this legitimacy, Grassi bitterly protests (under the name of Sarsi and 
on behalf of his Jesuit colleagues) what he perceives to be his portrayal as a scien-
tific reactionary. Nothing is farther from the truth, the author of Libra complains; 
he is a champion of progress and a staunch defender of Galileo and his 
instruments:
There were not lacking those who … asserted that … the telescope carries spectres to the 
eyes and deludes the mind with various images; therefore it does not display genuinely and 
without deception even those things which we observe close at hand, much less those 
which are far removed from us, except it will show them bewitched and deformed. We … 
publicly confuted the ignorance of those for whom this instrument was of no significance 
… we hoped that by protecting from invidious calumnies this telescope … we might there-
fore deserve well of [Galileo] rather than ill.23
There is no particular reason for Grassi to reject the telescope. Traditional mathe-
matical optics provides him with a clear and trustworthy account of the principles 
of the instrument’s operation:
Objects are enlarged by the telescope because these objects are carried from it to the eye 
under a greater angle then they are observed without this instrument … according to optics, 
whatever things are observed under a larger angle seem larger.24
This analysis also provides him with an explanation, again in terms taken directly 
from traditional eye-centered, Euclidean-based optics, why the fixed stars, and 
presumably comets, should elude magnification:
Be the visible objective whatever it may, the more it is removed from the eye the smaller 
and smaller the angle at which it is seen … thus, the angle of incidence of the images at 
the telescope scarcely vary after the objects have reached a very great distance, for then it 
is just as if all the rays fell perpendicularly on the lens.25
Note how ‘modern’ Grassi is, how well entrenched in the most contemporary 
cosmology: Copernican or Tychonian, Grassi’s world offers “very great dis-
tance” for the fixed stars. Yet Kepler and Galileo’s move towards the abolition 
of the dichotomy between eye and instrument, if Grassi is aware of either, has 
22 Galileo 1623, 220.
23 Sarsi 1619, 80–81.
24 Grassi 1619, 79.
25 Grassi 1619, 82.
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left him completely unaffected. The “visible object,” for him, is seen by the eye. 
The telescope is of a different status altogether; it is a part of the medium through 
which vision occurs, and subject to the same mathematical analysis. It helps like 
any instrument might – hence the title Libra – but it does not change the principal 
onus of evidence and argument. This lies, always, with what “could be observed 
without any instrument and by observation with the unaided eye.”26
With this loyalty to the naked eye, as far as Galileo is concerned, Grassi com-
pletely misses the import of the telescope. Grassi, we saw, was taken aback by the 
vehemence of Galileo’s replies, and understood them as a defense of telescopic 
observation. But his baffled defense of his credentials in this respect was misplaced. 
Galileo had even less patience for his hearty support than for his mild criticism: 
“Sig. Sarsi, give up trying to exalt this instrument with this admirable new proper-
ties of yours unless you wish to throw it into utter disrepute.”27 His sarcasm aside, 
what is clear is that Galileo was not disturbed by Grassi’s empirical claims but by 
his analysis and arguments, and disturbed enough that he felt compelled to reject 
both Grassi’s support and his conclusions.
Galileo has no qualms about Grassi’s geometrical analysis of magnification “for 
objects seen naturally.” In that case, “the diminution of the angle is made in a con-
tinually greater ratio the more the object is removed.”28 But Galileo has little respect 
for the way objects are “seen naturally.” From Galileo’s point of view, the instru-
ment does not extend the sense organ, but replaces it altogether, and in the process 
it is the naked eye that loses its legitimacy as a source of knowledge:
The naked eye distinguishes none of these shapes [of the heavenly bodies] without the 
telescope. 29
Galileo, then, does not reject Grassi’s cosmological conclusions because he nur-
tures some deep-held belief in the sublunary nature of comets. Rather, he finds 
himself placing the comets in the “elemental sphere” because he is adamant to 
reject the implications of Grassi’s main arguments to the contrary. Namely: that 
fixed stars, like comets, are not magnified by the telescope, which implies that the 
telescope does not magnify all objects; and that absence of parallax is the unassail-
able testimony for the great distance of comets, which implies the supremacy of 
what “could be observed without any instrument and by observation with the 
unaided eye.”
It will be a mistake to think of Galileo as defending the telescope or apologizing 
for its failure to magnify very distant objects. There is no such failure, he insists: 
26 Grassi 1619, 14.
27 Galilei 1623, 209.
28 Galilei 1623, 221.
29 Galilei 1623, 321. “Senza il telescipio, l’occhio libero niuna di cotali figure distingue.” Galilei 
1890–1909, 6: 359.
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comets and fixed stars do not appear magnified to the eye because of a distortion 
produced by the eye and repaired by the telescope:
what we meant by saying the telescope ‘robs the stars of irradiation’ … is that it operates 
upon the stars in such a way [as to circumvent] the irradiation which disturbs the naked eye 
and impedes precise perception.30
The eye introduces a spurious splendor around stars and comets that makes them 
appear larger. This is not real magnification, of course: the body of the celestial 
objects remains invisible to the naked eye. Because the telescope removes this 
“irradiation,” the eye fails to notice that it has also magnified and made visible the 
celestial bodies themselves. This is not an apologia for the instrument. Rather, it is 
a charge against the eye, which errs twice: once in introducing the false “wig” and 
once in failing to notice the correction and magnification.31 Grassi’s claim that fixed 
stars and comets “suffered scarcely any enlargement” meant that they did not 
appear larger to the eye. But the eye, in Galileo’s new radical instrumentalism, is no 
longer the main point of reference for visual phenomena, and definitely not the final 
adjudicator of their trustworthiness.
3  Looking at the Sun
Kepler’s excitement over Galileo’s instrument was genuine. The coming of the 
telescope facilitated a new level of accuracy that far exceeds the abilities of the 
human naked eye. The resulting, artificially-produced image made Tycho Brahe’s 
accurate and meticulous observations obsolete. Kepler, who regarded Brahe’s 
observations as “the pinnacle” of human scientific enterprise, had to admit that 
“your telescope, Galileo, surpasses these attainments.”32 It is true that Tycho mea-
sured celestial degrees most accurately, but with the new instrument the astronomer 
“subdivides [Tycho’s celestial degrees] with the utmost nicety into minutes and 
fractions of minutes.” Consequently, the intellect, which until the invention of the 
telescope could have only abstractly fathom certain generalities about the heaven, 
could now be assisted with exact and concrete observations of the distant realms. 
The intellectual imaginations of ancient philosophers as well as of Copernicus, 
30 Galilei 1623, 324.
31 This is a recapitulation of his arguments (including the hairy metaphor) in the Sidereus Nuncius: 
“The reason for this is that when the stars are observed with the naked eye, they do not show 
themselves according to their simple and, so to speak, naked size, but rather surrounded by a 
certain brightness and crowned by twinkling rays … Stars are therefore seen unshorn in the midst 
of darkness, but daylight can shear them of their hair … The spyglass likewise does the same 
thing: for first it takes away the borrowed and accidental brightness from the stars and thereupon 
it enlarges their simple globes.” Galilei 1989 [1610], 57–58.
32 Kepler 1965 [1610], 21–22.
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Bruno and Kepler himself were disassociated from the limitations of sense experi-
ence. The telescope allowed the new philosopher to compare these fantasies on the 
shape and character of the planets to real observations.
The excitement was genuine, because by the time he was presented with 
Galileo’s instrument, Kepler himself was already pursuing the astronomical use 
of optical (that is – lens based) instruments for some time. Even more important, 
Kepler shared with Galileo an understanding of the significance of the tele-
scope: optical instruments were to take primacy in observation, and the eye 
would need to be integrated into them. This epistemological novelty, that Galileo 
would hint at in the Sidereus Nuncius of 1610 and attempt to explain in the con-
troversy over the comets a decade later, was already explicated in Kepler’s 1604 
optical opus magnum, the Optical Part of Astronomy (Ad Vitellionem 
Paralipomena).33 Kepler provides a vivid example for this new instrumental 
empiricism in describing his observation of a lunar eclipse through a Camera 
Obscura. Introducing an artificially-produced image, Kepler turns his instru-
ment of observation into the locus of astronomical knowledge, and lets the 
human observer slip out of his optics:
On 1602 21/31 December at 6h in the morning, through a device described in Ch. 2 
[camera obscura] and an instrument made for this purpose, a description of which is 
furnished below, the moon made an image of itself brightly upon the paper lying below, 
inverted in situation, just as it was in the heavens, gibbous … You should not think that 
what I would consider to be in the moon’s ray was in the paper, for both the gibbous face 
and the spot in its middle were carried over to all parts of the paper whatever that was 
placed beneath it; rather, indeed, it was from moving the paper that the spot was first 
discovered.34
The observation, Kepler stresses, is not his. It is no-one’s. The image of the moon 
is not the culmination of a cognitive process. It does not require an observer; a piece 
of paper is enough. In fact, even the paper is not necessary: it can be moved around 
without affecting the production of the image.35 A decade later and a few years 
before entangling himself in the debate over the comets, Galileo observed the sun 
33 Kepler 1937– [1604]; Kepler 2000 [1604]. We will use Ad Vitellionem (1937– [1604]) to refer 
to the original Latin and Optics (2000 [1604]) to refer to Donahue’s translation.
34 Kepler 2000 [1604], 259.
35 The relation between the camera obscura and the eye is at the heart of the historiographic debate 
concerning Kepler’s optics. For Straker (1971, and cf. Crombie 1953) the instrument represents 
Kepler’s novel commitment to the mechanization of the eye and his indebtedness to the artisanal 
tradition. Kepler’s claim that the locus of images is the retina rather than the crystalline humor, 
Straker argues, is an immediate consequence of comparing the eye to a camera obscura. Lindberg, 
in contrast, argues for Kepler’s reliance on the perspectivist tradition, stresses that “only on one 
occasion did [Kepler] explicitly compared the eye to a camera obscura” (Lindberg 1976, 206). As 
we claimed above and will argue below, this debate is somewhat misdirected: Kepler’s main moti-
vation in equating the eye and the camera obscura is legitimating the instrument no less than 
understanding the eye.
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spots in a similar way; only instead of the simple Camera Obscura he posited a 
telescope between the observed object (the sun) and the paper:
Direct the telescope upon the Sun as if you were going to observe that body. Having 
focused and steadied it, expose a flat white sheet of paper about a foot from the concave 
lens; upon this will fall a circular image of the Sun’s disk, with all the spots that are on 
it arranged and disposed with exactly the same symmetry as in the Sun. The more the 
paper is moved away from the tube, the larger this image will become, and the better 
the spots will be depicted … In order to picture them accurately, I first describe on the 
paper a circle of the size that best suits me, and then by moving the paper towards or 
away from the tube I find the exact place where the image of the Sun is enlarged to the 
measure of the circle I have drawn. This also serves me as a norm and rule for getting 
the plane of the paper right, so that it will not be tilted to the luminous cone of sunlight 
that emerges from the telescope. … By tilting the paper the proper position is easily 
found, and then with a pen one may mark out the spots in their right sizes, shapes, and 
position.36
As Galileo does in his lunar observations, Kepler relegates the eye to a secondary role, 
as the sunlight imprints (stampata) the image on the paper. The observer is turned into 
a draughtsman whose role is to stabilize and trace the outlines of the image.
Galileo’s telescope thrust into public attention the assumptions implicit in 
Kepler’s highly professional new optics with its direct challenge to the traditional 
eye-oriented modes of astronomical observation. It compelled astronomers to 
reconsider their epistemological manual as to what is a valid observational practice, 
but not many were willing to adopt Kepler and Galileo’s epistemology together 
with their instruments. The Jesuits, loyal to their mandate to employ the novelties 
of the New Science in the service of the mores of counter-reformation church,37 
were particularly conspicuous in their efforts to implement the new means and 
techniques of observation while completely ignoring the marginalization of the 
human eye that for Kepler and Galileo was a necessary implication. Their debate 
with Galileo over the sunspots was, in this respect, analogous to the comets debate 
to follow. Their representative, Christoph Scheiner, fiercely competed with Galileo 
for credit on the empirical discovery, and between them, Scheiner’s interpretation 
of it was, metaphysically, the more radical: the spots, he suggested, were shadows 
of hitherto unknown planets. Epistemologically, however, he remained unwavering 
in his commitment to the superiority of the naked eye. Ignoring the obvious haz-
ards, he insistently used his eyes to look at the sun. This in spite of the different 
filtering devices he had to apply in order to protect his eyes that distorted and 
obscured the observations. Like Grassi, Scheiner was proficient with the new 
instruments and techniques, and experimented with projecting images from the 
telescope on a white surface (Fig. 2). These projections, however, were not intended 
to produce pictures of the sunspots but merely to examine any flaws in the lenses 
as well as other optical effects produced by them. Scheiner invested much energy 
36 Galilei 1890–1909, 5: 136–137. Quoted and translated in Biagioli 2006, 190.
37 Cf. Dear 1995, esp. Chapter 2, and Feldhay 2000.
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to minimize the role of the instrumental mediation so the sunspots will be “seen 
without a tube, by the eye of any man.”38
Like the ensuing one over the comets, the controversy over the sunspots was not 
primarily over observations and their interpretation. Rather, it revealed a deeper 
level of contention concerning what the role of vision is in the production of knowl-
edge. The Jesuits, following Scheiner, devoted most of their efforts to preserving 
the status of the eye as the guarantor of any knowledge of nature. Disregarding 
Kepler’s rejection of the traditional distinction between direct and mediated vision, 
Jesuit mathematicians held on to the Pauline belief in the supremacy of “face to 
face” acquaintance. In his 1613 large volume containing Opticorum libri sex: 
Philosophis iuxta ac Mathematicis utiles the Jesuit Fransciscus Agvilonius most 
emphatically reaffirmed traditional hierarchy of sight:
All the things that are contained in Optics are considered under a triple reason, [compared] 
to the triple mode through which creatures come to know God. First direct [vision], that is 
our eye, as it turns towards the thing in front of it, so it is compared to the cognition of the 
minds of the blessed contemplating the presence of God, as St. Paul said: face to face. The 
second [part] is reflection [repercussion] that is the perception of those things, whose 
Fig. 2 Chistophoro Scheiner, Rosa Ursina (1626–1630)
38 Galilei 1890–1909, 5: 59–61. Quoted and discussed in Biagioli 2006, 200–201.
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images come back to us from mirrors, this is not unlike that cognition, that through faith 
we see God in the created things as in a kind of mirror or in enigmas. Thence the third, that 
we call infraction; this is how the species of things are transmitted through dissimilar 
diaphanous [media], and from them [the species] enter the eye as if deformed and frac-
tured. Thus some of the divinatory notions of the heathens, corrupted by many errors, are 
affected by the light of nature only.39
Whether he is ignorant of Kepler and Galileo’s new concept of the eye and its place 
in visual perception or consciously rejecting it, Agvilonius’ commitment to the 
traditional cognitive hierarchy and especially the distinction between mediated and 
direct vision remains unwavering: any mediation is a source of enigmas, distortions 
or heathen delusions and errors.
4  Kepler: the Eye as an Instrument
For Kepler, the introduction of the telescope provided another demonstration of the 
poverty of this hierarchy and the need to undo the supremacy of “face to face” 
vision that Grassi, Scheiner and Agvilonius assumed. Galileo’s observations made 
it ever clearer that true knowledge of heavenly bodies was produced through the 
mediation of lenses and their complex and multiple refractions. Kepler was very 
explicit that his own treatise on optics was to provide optical foundations for a new, 
instrument-based astronomical observation: artificiosa observationes, as he calls 
them in the subtitle.
Published 5 years before the advent of the telescope, the main artificial instrument 
of observation to occupy Kepler’s attention in the Ad Vitellionem is, as we saw, the 
camera obscura. Kepler first establishes its legitimacy and efficiency by demon-
strating that the image obtained through it is indeed that of the observed object.40 
He goes on to elucidate by way of physical simulation its underlying principle, 
namely – the formation of an image on a screen behind a small aperture:
39 Agvilonius 1613, 3. “Continetur omnis Optice triplici fere videndi ratione … triplici etiam modo 
quo deum creaturae cognoscunt, … comparauit. Prima directa, quae est oculi nostri, sic, ut in rem 
propositam intendit, cum illa cognitione componitur qua beatorum mentes praesentem Deum, 
facie ad faciem, ut D. Loquitur Paulus, contemplatur. Altera repercussa, sive earum rerum percep-
tio, quarum a speculis ad nos imagines revertuntur, cui non absimlis est illa cognitio, qua Deum 
per fidem in rebus creatis, veluti quodam speculo aut aenigmate videmus. Tertia denique, quam 
infractam vocant, ea est, qua rerum species per dissimilia diaphana transmissae, et ab iisdem quasi 
deformatae ac fractae in oculos immittuntur. Sic Ethnici divinitatis notionem aliquam, sed multis 
erroribus vitiatam, naturae solius lumine affecuti sunt.”
40 For the import of the camera obscura in the study of Kepler’s optics see f.n. 35.
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I set a book in a high place, which was to stand for a luminous body. Between this and the 
pavement a tablet with a polygonal hole was set up. Next, a thread was sent down from one 
corner of the book through the hole to the pavement, falling upon the pavement in such a 
way as to graze the edges of the hole, the image of which I traced with chalk. In this way 
a figure was created upon the pavement similar to the hole. The same thing occurred when 
an additional thread was added from the second, third and fourth corner of the book, as well 
as from the infinite points of the edges. In this way, a narrow row of infinite figures of the 
whole outlined the large quadrangular figure of the book on the pavement.41
The threads from the book’s corners pass through the polygonal hole, grazing its 
edges and projecting images in the shape of the hole – a hole-shaped image for each 
corner of the book. The four images of the book’s corners are arranged on the floor 
in reverse order, and when this process is repeated from (ideally) every point of the 
book, a multitude of hole-shaped images will be projected on the floor, arranged in 
the (reversed) pattern of the book.
This is a neat solution to an age old mystery, but the solution is not where the 
novelty of Kepler’s optics rests. Neither the phenomenon of pinhole images, on 
which the camera obscura is based, nor its account in terms of intersecting rays is 
new to the optical tradition.42 Explanations of the phenomena based on geometrical 
analysis of rays were available to the optical tradition at least since Levi ben 
Gershon (Gersonides) in the beginning of the fourteenth century.
Kepler’s novelty is in setting the stage to the radical instrumentalization of 
observation he would share with Galileo by eradicating from his explanation any 
references to the eye and human vision. For the perspectivist account from 
Gersonides to Maurolyco in the first half of the sixteenth century, the pinhole image 
was not just a reliable projection of its source. It was a unique re-presentation of 
the sun.43 The circular image was not caused by the sun and by light; it was the true 
form of the sun or the perfect dissemination proper of light, as John Pecham in the 
late thirteenth century explains:
The spherical shape is associated with light and is in harmony with all the bodies of the 
world as being to the highest degree conservative of nature, all parts of which join together 
most perfectly within itself. This is why a raindrop assumes roundness. Therefore, light is 
naturally moved toward this shape and gradually assumes it when propagated some 
distance.44
Understood this way, the circularity of the image does not simply testify to a property 
of its source; it is a sign of the image’s indubitable authenticity. This essential relation 
between source and image completely disappears from Kepler’s account, together 
with the exactness of representation it insures. There is nothing unique to the 
41 Kepler 2000 [1604], 56.
42 See Aristotle 1984, Problems Bk 15, Ch. 6, 911b1, 2:1417; Pecham 1970, 67. See also Lindberg 
1968, 1969; Thro 1996, 20–54.
43 Cf. Lindberg 1969, 303 ff. For Maurolyco on pinhole images see Zik and Hon 2007.
44 Pecham 1970, 70–71.
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circularity of the pinhole image: a rectangular body will produce a rectangular 
image, as the experiment with the book shows. Neither does the pinhole image 
represent light: it is light that is simulated by the threads pulled through the hole, 
but the image projected on the pavement can be of any object, not necessarily lumi-
nous – a book. The trustworthiness of the projection, for Kepler, does not rest on 
its perfect loyalty to the object projected but on understanding the physical process 
of projection. Indeed, Kepler discovers, one cannot hope for such loyalty: The 
book-pattern on the floor is created by a “narrow row” of partially overlapping 
“figures,” so not only is the image reversed, its boundaries are fuzzy. Moreover, 
these stains are reflections of the aperture. Even for those perspectivists, like 
Maurolyco, who appear to suggest a similar account, the image cast through the 
aperture is composed of many images of the luminous body. These are merged 
together as the distance of the screen from the aperture grows and the images of the 
source grow respectively.45 Kepler’s “figures” bear no resemblance to the light 
source. The complete, smooth, upright perception of the book on the pavement is a 
construct.
What Galileo would try to affect with his fierce rhetoric – the takeover of 
astronomy by artificiosa observationes – Kepler attempts to legitimize by turning 
optics into a mathematical-physical study of the production of images by light:
from the Sun, and from the colors illuminated by the Sun, species exactly alike are flowing, 
diminished by the flow itself, until for whatever reason, they fall on an opaque medium, 
where they paint their source: and vision is produced, when the opaque screen of the eye 
is painted this way46
In any act of visual perception, light is a necessary mediator in communicating 
visual data. It is light that carries images, bouncing of “an opaque medium” and 
falling on an “opaque screen.” If the screen happens to be the eye, “vision is pro-
duced,” but there is nothing unique to the eye: any screen will do.47 Even though 
there can be no doubt that Kepler is deeply indebted to the perspectivist tradition,48 
indebtedness he generously acknowledges by titling his book after Witelo, Kepler’s 
transformation of optics is a fundamental.
The subject matter of traditional optics was human vision. Vision, so was its 
basic assumption, is a direct acquaintance of the visual faculty with visible objects, 
and optics is the study of the agents whose function is to communicate these objects 
to the eye.49 This communication – the optical process – has always been self-
evidently teleological. It was aimed at providing adequate images of visible objects 
for the intellect: “a species produced by a visible object has the essential property 
45 See Lindberg 1985, esp. 37–40; and Lindberg 1984, esp. 134–135, also Zik and Hon 2007, 
esp. 561.
46 Kepler 1937– [1604], 41–42.
47 Kepler 1937– [1604], 41–42.
48 This is the central argument of Lindberg 1976.
49 For the role of these visual impressions in medieval spirituality see: Park 1998, 254–271; 
Hamburger 2000, 47–69.
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of manifesting the object of which it is the likeness” says Pecham.50 Kepler was 
well aware of this: “Aristotle defines light,” he writes, “not … in its nature, but to 
the extent that it is characteristic of the process of vision.”51 The teleology survived 
throughout the Renaissance, for practical as well as theoretical optics: “Alberti’s 
picture,” Alpers points out, “begins not with the world seen, but with a viewer who 
is actively looking out at objects.”52 And indeed, summarizing scholastic optics for 
his audience of painters, humanists and art patrons, it is this teleology that Alberti 
chooses to stress:
Philosophers … Say that surfaces are measured by certain rays, ministers of vision as it is 
(quasi visendi ministris), which they therefore call visual rays, since by their agency the 
images of things are impressed upon the senses.53
The physical nature of the “ministers of vision” was debated since antiquity: simu-
lacra or forms, visual rays or species, but their teleology and authenticity were 
never in doubt. Grosseteste, for instance, founds them on the premise that it is an 
essential property of the visible object itself, its agency or ‘virtue’, which ‘multi-
plies’ itself until it made itself present to the eye:
A natural agent continuously multiplies its power from itself to the recipient, whether it 
acts on sense or on matter. This power is sometimes called species, sometimes a likeness, 
and it is the same thing whatever it may be called.54
Following Grosseteste’s teachings, Roger Bacon underscores the essential relation 
which assures the fidelity of the visual agents, the multiplied species, to the visible 
object: “species is similar in essence and definition to the agent and the things gener-
ating it.” 55 The authenticity of species was a fundamental assumption not only of 
optics but of medieval Aristotelianism as a whole; optics legitimated natural philoso-
phy by accounting for the fundamental knowability of His Creation.56 Visual rays 
guarantied the veracity of vision and the geometrical analysis of their propagation 
was always subordinate to the assumption of their intentionality and their consequent 
indubitability.57 So was the analysis of the eye, as Pecham stresses: “vision takes place 
by the arrangement of the species on [the surface of] the glacial humor exactly as [the 
parts] of the object [are arranged] outside.”58 This is so, precisely because “unless this 
50 Pecham 1970, 161.
51 Kepler 2000 [1604], 45. Cf. Smith 1981.
52 Alpers 1983, 41.
53 Alberti 1972, 41.
54 Grosseteste 1912, 60.
55 Bacon 1983, 7. “species sit similes agenti et generanti eam in essential et diffinitione.” Bacon 
1983, 7. For an extensive treatment of species in medieval optical theory see especially: Smith 
1981; Spruit 1994. Tachau 1982 provides an authoritative treatment of the issues involved in 
medieval theory of species, and also Tachau 1988. See also Denery II 2005, esp 82–96.
56 Smith 1981, 569.
57 For the teleological nature of the Aristotelian theory of perception cf. Descartes 1998, 
159–161.
58 Pecham 1970, 121. Italics added.
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were so, the eye would not see the object distinctly.”59 Optics, Pecham assumes, is 
a theory of visual perception, and any such theory that failed to account for the 
adequacy of the seen image is ipso facto false.
Kepler does away with this line of reasoning. The optical process, he declares, 
is strictly the effect of light: “genuine vision occurs when the folding door or pupil 
of the eye is exposed most closely to the arriving ray of light.”60 Gone are all inten-
tional agents, and with them – the privileged import of the eye. Passively receiving 
“illumination” like any instrument, the eye is not merely comparable to “a closed 
chamber”: the cornea is truly nothing but a lens; the retina nothing but a screen, 
essentially the same as the paper or the pavement; the pupil is just another aperture, 
“for the pupil takes the place of the window.”61
This is Kepler’s way of justifying the new observational astronomy. With light as 
the sole agent of all optical phenomena, there is no fundamental epistemological 
difficulty with observing the distant celestial phenomena: the mathematical nature 
of light and the assertion that the rays do not decay, only disperse (propositions 
6 and 7 of Ad Vitellionem) turns distance into nothing but an element in the 
geometrical analysis of observation.62 Even more important, with light there is no 
epistemological difficulty with artificiosa observationes. The image on the pave-
ment is reversed and fuzzy, but so is the one on the retina. The instrument is trust-
worthy not because it does not interfere with the visual flow, but because it is no 
worse than the eye.63
5  Epistemological Considerations
Kepler was well aware of the primary rival to radical instrumentalism: the tradi-
tional, Aristotelian empiricism assumed by Galileo’s Jesuit competitors, with its 
strict preference to the human sense,and he did not hesitate to challenge it directly 
and in detail.
According to Aristotle the initial state of cognition is perception; all that the 
intellect knows was previously in the senses.64 This assumption, Kepler insists, does 
not agree well with astronomical practice; it does not seem that “the motions of the 
heaven come immediately into the perception of the eyes.” The eye’s physiology 
59 Pecham 1970, 121.
60 Kepler 2000 [1604], 78.
61 Kepler 2000 [1604], 184.
62 For Kepler’s mathematization of light cf. Gal and Chen-Morris 2005.
63 We discuss in detail Kepler’s transformation of optics from a teleological theory of human vision 
into a causal theory of the production of the images by light, as well as its far reaching epistemo-
logical ramifications, in Gal and Chen-Morris 2010 (in press).
64 Aristotle 1984, Posterior analytics, II, 19, 100a4–15, 165–166.
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does not allow for such immediate perception: it is “attached to the posterior part 
of the head;” it has a spherical shape and it depends for its proper functioning on 
“the use of multiple refractions.” There is no lack of evidence that the eye judges 
motion erroneously, especially motion of distant objects, and Kepler provides a 
handful.65
These shortcomings are unavoidable, Kepler claims, and in fact the eyes will 
fault even the most acute observer, such as Tycho Brahe. His own instrumental 
empiricism was much more radical in intellectual ambitions and commitments than 
that of his mentor in matters of astronomical observations, and Kepler did not shy 
away from the difference. Tycho utilized the Camera Obscura to observe solar 
eclipses, Kepler points out, under the assumption that the astronomer’s eye remains 
the chief arbitrator and the instrument is but a prosthesis; a secondary aid to the 
sense of sight. Tycho thus “noticed that eclipses of the sun, whether the ray be 
allowed in through a notch or received by the eyes, always show the moon’s diam-
eter to be much less than it appears at oppositions.” Trusting the accuracy of his 
visual perception, Tycho concluded that the real lunar diameter is smaller than was 
assumed. He was, however, wrong, because he did not take into account “the actual 
structure of the sense of sight” and its tendency to enlarge “the edges of luminous 
bodies, particularly in darkness.” Kepler admonishes that the “astronomer should 
carefully take note of this … that unless he be endowed with the sharpest and most 
powerful sense of sight, he is not equal to measuring that moon’s diameter at the 
full with the eyes without error.” Therefore
one has to distinguish carefully … between those things that happen to the sense of sight 
and those that happen when the consideration of the sense of sight is removed. For those 
things that happen to the sense of sight vary by individual cases, but those things that really 
happen are uniform within a single horizon. … Astronomers will now take note of this: that 
one must not trust the sense of sight… it cannot therefore be argued from this accident of 
the sense of sight to what happens outside the consideration of the sense of sight … For 
astronomers should not present anything other than those things that in actual fact occur. 
The sense of vision, however, we leave to the physicians to remedy.66
The remedy of astronomical observation and measurements is relegating the eyes 
in favor of an instrument. The careful application of the Camera Obscura allows “a 
most certain procedure for measuring the quantities of eclipses … If this device be 
correctly applied, the diameter of the moon appears decidedly greater than the 
amount that Tycho’s table shows.”67
In spite of his insistence that the application of instruments to astronomical 
investigation was the only way to avoid “the inadequacies of the eyes,”68 Kepler 
was not promoting skepticism about the human senses. The purpose of his optics 
is to “subdue the hostile fortress of doubt,”69 not to reinforce it, and much of 
65 Kepler 2000 [1604], 336.
66 Kepler 2000 [1604], 298.
67 Kepler 2000 [1604], 298.
68 Kepler 2000 [1604], 57.
69 Kepler 1937- [1604], 2:6.
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Ad Vitellionem is dedicated to accounting for the reliability of the retinal image. 
Galileo, unperturbed by Kepler’s careful optical and epistemological delibera-
tions, is significantly more extreme in his stand for the instrument: the eye medi-
ates and distorts; the instrument provides the standard of trustworthy perception 
against which the eye is to be judged. In a sense, Galileo re-introduces the dis-
tinction between direct and mediated vision that Kepler labored to abolish, 
reversing the epistemological order between eye and instrument. The two ways 
of observation, he argues during the controversy over the comets, provide data 
of entirely different value, not to be conflated or compared, and his adversary 
Grassi is fundamentally wrong to submit the telescope to the same analysis as 
ocular vision:
Your error lies in comparing the star taken together with its irradiation when seen with the 
naked eye to the body of the star alone when seen with the telescope and distinguished 
from the irradiated regions.70
If Kepler was keen to hold the skeptical ramifications of his optics at bay, Galileo 
is unhesitant: his endorsement of the instrument comes at the expense and with the 
explicit distrust in the eye. The human organ is not merely weak but a positive 
source of various deceptions, which he makes a point to enumerate:
There is another illumination here, made by refraction in the moist surface of the eye, and 
by this, the real object appears to us to be surrounded by a luminous circle … there is a 
third vivid splendor here, almost as bright as that of the original light itself; this is produced 
by reflection of the primary rays in the moisture at the edges of the eyelids, and it extends 
over the convexity of the pupil … this radiant crown [is] a sensation of the eye … it does 
not depend upon the illumination of the surrounding area.71
Like Kepler, Galileo thrusts the eye into the outside world. From a veridical conduit 
of knowledge it becomes part of a causal process of material nature, producing 
phenomena to be studied and explained physically. And while the eye mediates, 
adds spurious and distorting brilliance, the telescope is not only a reliable source, 
but the standard against which to judge the observation made through the eye and 
the means by which to remove the errors it introduces:
Fancy to yourself some definite size for [a] wig, and in the center of this imagine a very 
tiny luminous body. The shape of this will be lost, being crowned by excessively long hair 
… the telescope, by enlarging the star but not the wig, makes the tiny disc which originally 
was imperceptible … so that its shape may be well distinguished. 72
70 Galilei 1623, 326.
71 Galilei 1623, 319–320.
72  Galilei 1623, 322–323. “Figuratevi una determinate grandezza d’una capellatura; nel mezo della 
quale se voi intenderete essere un piccolissimo corpo luminoso, perderà la sua figura, coronato 
di troppo lunghi crini … il telescopio, accrescendo la stella ma non la chioma, fa che, dove prima 
il piccolissimo disco tra sì ampio fulgore era impercettibile … si può distinguere ed assai ben 
figurare.” Galilei 1890–1909; 6 360–361.
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6  The Eye of the Mind
The metaphor of the “wig” – this paradigm of artificiality – to denote the eye-added 
splendor stresses Galileo’s deliberate inversion of natural and artificial, direct and 
mediated. Galileo encapsulates his argument for this inversion of epistemological 
roles and standing in his most famous phrase of the “Assayer:”
Philosophy is written in this grand book – I mean the universe … in the language of 
mathematics.73
The eye had always been, and for Grassi, Scheiner, and Agvilonius still was, the 
divinely assigned instrument of visual knowledge. This is nicely and simply put by 
Scheiner in his Oculus published in 1619, with no immediate reference to any of 
the controversies: “in order to see, the eye of the animal fulfils the duty it was 
ordained by God, grasping the presence of visible things.”74 For Kepler and Galileo, 
the eye loses this independent “duty” and becomes part of the “things.” It intro-
duces error because it is immersed in the confusing nature to be observed and its 
passions and affects are causally-bound physical phenomena.
The telescope, on the other hand, is not bound to the physical world. It is math-
ematical in essence, argues Galileo; it is fully captured by the mathematical laws 
governing the shape and relative placing of its lenses; “the convex lens unites the 
rays, the concave glass expands them and forms an inverted cone.” 75 The asymp-
totic diminution of the angle of vision to the eye, with which Grassi accounted for 
the apparent lack of magnification, is thus of no significance. Magnification is 
strictly a mathematical relation, and the telescope always magnifies, whether the 
eye is capable of perceiving it or not. In a pedantic mood, Galileo even insists that 
changing the mutual position of the lenses results in having a completely different 
instrument:
[Sarsi] says that a telescope which is now long and now short may be called the same 
instrument though differently applied … Our case is just the reverse, for the use of the 
telescope is always the same … while the instrument itself is diversified by its alteration in 
one essential respect, which is the interval between its lenses.76
73 Galilei 1623, 183–184.
74 Scheiner 1619, 2.
75 Galilei 1623, 209. Antoni Malet writes: “In our understanding of them, telescopes always work 
by producing geometrical optical images, real or virtual, regardless of whether or not any observer 
is peering through them. From our theoretical point of view, it does not matter whether an eye, or 
a screen, or just empty space gets the light rays coming out of the ocular lens, because the tele-
scope always produces one geometrical image. However, in Kepler’s time, and up to the last 
decades of the seventeenth century, when somebody looked through a telescope, it was not under-
stood to work by producing images similar to the pictures projected upon screens” (Malet 2005, 
239). We differ from Malet in arguing that in spite of the absence of theoretical grounding, the 
independence of the geometrical image from the observer is exactly the position Galileo formu-
lates and defends.
76 Galileo 1623, 225.
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This pedantry is not merely a rhetorical maneuver. As Sven Dupré has recently 
shown against what has been long assumed, Galileo did develop a mathematical 
understanding of the telescope.77 This was based on contemporary optics, which 
owed as much to new lens and mirror grinding techniques as to traditional perspec-
tive theory, and it was not informed by Kepler’s innovations, but it provided Galileo 
with the confidence to insist on the mathematical nature of his instrument. Being 
thoroughly mathematical, the telescope is not an extension of the eye but of reason. 
As was beautifully put by his fellow Lyncean Johann Faber, Galileo,
with marvellous skill so fit spectacles to an aging world that with mind still sound but eyes 
dimmed and body weakened it might see through two glasses. 78
In an important sense, we saw, Faber was missing Galileo’s point: the telescope was 
not a pair of spectacles. But he did capture the dream of an instrument of mind, 
superior to the eye and answering directly to the laws of reason, which a few years 
earlier Kepler put into more careful, less exhilarating prose:
Certainly, the mind itself, if it never had the use of an eye at all, would demand an eye for 
itself for the comprehension of things outside it, and would lay down laws of its structure 
which were drawn from itself (if in fact it were pure and sound and without hindrance, that 
is, if it were only what it is).79
In Kepler’s terms, Galileo could have said that the telescope is the sense organ that 
reason would have had. For this reason he finds it is very important to stress that 
in contrast to its Dutch predecessor, his telescope was “discovered by the way of 
reason.” “The original contraption was accidentally discovered by a “simple maker 
of ordinary spectacles” (he does not honor Hans Lipperhey by name) who “in 
casually handling pieces of glass of various sorts happened to look through two at 
once, one convex and the other concave, and placed at different distances from the 
eye.” His instrument, on the other hand, followed a “reasoning” which he cursorily 
recounts, allegedly to “render less incredulous those people who, like Sarsi, may 
wish to diminish whatever praise there is in it that belongs to me.”80 One can easily 
identify with Grassi’s astonishment at the ingratitude of the one he dubbed “the 
Lynx,” but it was less important for Galileo to gather supporters than to clarify that 
his instrument was no pair of spectacles (and he, of course, no “simple maker”). It 
does not assist the eye; it is an extension of reason, an embodied mathematical 
entity, and it can allow reason an unmediated approach to reality because reality 
is mathematical, “written in this grand book … the universe … in the language of 
mathematics.”
77 Dupré 2005. See also Zik and Van Helden 2003.
78 Faber in Galileo 1623, 154. “[An], velut in vetulo languentes corpore ocelli, Mente tamen valida, 
per duo vitra vident, Forte senescenti tu sic OCULARIA mundo Aptasti, mirae dexteritatis opus?” 
Faber in Galilei 1890–1909, 6: 205.
79 Kepler 1937– [1619], 6: 304.
80 Galilei 1623, 212–213.
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This is the import of the celebrated idiom on the mathematical language of 
nature: to re-construct observed reality so it can be approached by reason, through 
the instrument. It is not an ontological justification for mathematical theorizing but 
for radical instrumental empiricism; nature is written in a language legible only 
through the instrument. The telescope does not mediate – it reveals the real makeup 
of nature; shapes, figures, quantities – directly to Reason. The senses mediate, cre-
ating appearances which are not proper representations of the “external bodies:”
I do not believe that for exciting in us tastes, odors and sounds there are required in external 
bodies anything but sizes, shapes, numbers, and slow or fast movements; and I think that 
if ears, tongues, and noses were taken away, shapes and numbers and motions would 
remain, but not odors or tastes or sounds. These, I believe, are nothing but names, apart 
from the living animal just as tickling and titillation are nothing but names when armpits 
and the skin around the nose are upset.81
“Sizes, shapes, numbers, and slow or fast movements;” nature is comprised of ele-
ments the instrument makes apparent, but the senses mask by with “tastes, odors 
and sound … tickling and titillation.” And what is true for noses and armpits is just 
as true for the eye:
I believe that vision, the sense which is eminent above all others, is related to light, but in 
that ratio of excellence which exists between the finite and the infinite, the temporal and 
the instantaneous, the quantity and the indivisible; between darkness and light.82
7  Conclusion: The Price
Some 50 years later, Robert Hooke, the seventeenth century’s most definitive 
beneficiary from and prominent follower of the legacy of radical instrumental 
empiricism, would give the conquest of the artificial over the natural a religious aura. 
In terms of “observations” and the capacity to “behold the works of nature” through 
the senses, Mankind is essentially inferior to “Beasts:”
As for the actions of our Senses, we cannot but observe them to be in many particulars 
much outdone by those of other Creatures, and when at best, to be far short of the perfec-
tion they seem capable of.83
This ‘shortness of perfection” is our own doing, but deliverance is also within our 
grasp:
By the addition of such artificial Instruments and methods, there may be, in some manner, 
a reparation made for the mischiefs, and imperfection, mankind has drawn upon it self, by 
negligence, and intemperance, and a wilful and superstitious deserting the Prescripts and 
Rules of Nature, whereby every man, both from a deriv’d corruption, innate and born with 
81 Galilei 1623, 311.
82 Galilei 1623, 311–312.
83 Hooke 1665, xvii–xviii.
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him, and from his breeding and converse with men, is very subject to slip into all sorts of 
errors.84
Hooke may be overstated, but he is completely sincere. It is appropriate to discuss 
instruments in terms of fall and redemption, “the only way which now remains for 
us to recover some degree of those former perfections” (Hooke 1665, xvii), because 
they represent the one divine advantage that humans enjoy over beasts:
It is the great prerogative of Mankind above other Creatures, that we are not only able to 
behold the works of Nature, or barely to sustein our lives by them, but we have also the 
power of considering, comparing, altering, assisting, and improving them to various uses. 
And as this is the peculiar priviledge of humane Nature in general, so is it capable of being 
so far advanced by the helps of Art, and Experience, as to make some Men excel others in 
their Observations, and Deductions, almost as much as they do Beasts.85
For Hooke, the arguments that have turned proper observation to the work of the 
mind rather than the senses have become almost a commonplace. He ignores, or 
suppresses, the great tensions and anxieties with which these arguments came. Such 
indifference was not an option for Galileo and Kepler. Hooke can marvel at 
“Telescopes or Microscopes producing new Worlds and Terra-Incognita’s to our 
view” (Hooke 1665, xxxii), but Galileo, anxious to defend the mathematical rapport 
by which he legitimized the inversion of epistemological standings, finds himself 
defending the simplicity of its revelation. Gone are the marvels and wonders of the 
Sidereus Nuncius; radical instrumentalism requires the bare bones representation of 
the heavens as the “triangles, circles and other geometrical figures” of Fig. 3. And 
Hooke can simply complain that “the eye cannot distinguish a smaller object then 
[sic.] appears within the angle of half a minute,”86 but Kepler has to admit that 
vision, as a whole, has become a complete mystery:
How this image or picture is joined together with the visual spirits that reside in the retina 
and in the nerve, and whether it is arraigned within by the spirits into the caverns of the 
cerebrum to the tribunal of the soul or of the visual faculty; whether the visual faculty, like 
a magistrate, given by the soul, descending from the headquarters of the cerebrum outside 
to the visual nerve itself and the retina, as to lower courts, might go forth to meet this image – 
this, I say, I leave to the natural philosophers to argue about.87
The mediation of light justified radical instrumentalism. It supported and explained 
the marvellous achievements of the camera obscura, the telescope and later the 
microscope, and provided a most convincing account of the function of the eye 
itself. But it came at a most difficult price, a bewilderment that would haunt the 
New Science: how is it that we see at all?
84 Hooke 1665, xvii.
85 Hooke 1665, xvii.
86 Hooke 1674, 8.
87 Kepler 2000 [1604], 180.
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